Security and trust

Last updated: 10 November 2026

Promoters trust Wildfire with their buyers, their ticket money and their door. This page says how we keep each of those safe, plainly and without promises we cannot keep.

Where the data lives

  • Wildfire runs on a server of its own, rented from Contabo and run by Wildfire. Its databases cannot be reached from the internet: only the app on the same machine talks to them.
  • The server is reached for maintenance only with a key, never a password.
  • Every night a backup of the databases is made, encrypted on the server before it leaves, and kept for 7 days with a second provider (Dropbox), so one outage cannot take out the server and its backups together. Restoring from it has been tested.
  • Apart from the server and its encrypted backups, Wildfire keeps no copy of the database anywhere.
  • The access logs of Wildfire's own servers do not keep the links that open a buyer's order or tickets, and are deleted after 7 days.

Accounts and who may do what

  • Promoters sign in with a password and can add an authenticator app or a passkey. Selling tickets through Wildfire needs one of the two.
  • Before money can move or data can leave, such as linking a Stripe account, refunding, cancelling an event or exporting orders, Wildfire asks for that second factor again if it was not used in the last ten minutes.
  • People an account invites each sign in with their own login and get a role: admin, manager, finance, viewer or door. Every read and write in the database is checked against that account and that role.
  • When Wildfire's own staff look into an account to help, it is written down, and they cannot move money or export data while they do.

Payments

  • Buyers pay on Stripe's own payment page, into the promoter's own Stripe account. Card and bank details go to Stripe and never reach Wildfire.
  • Wildfire's fee is taken from each payment by Stripe as it happens. Wildfire never holds a promoter's ticket money and never pays it out.
  • Every message from Stripe is checked for Stripe's signature, and a message about one promoter's payment can never change another promoter's order.

Tickets at the door

  • Each ticket's QR code is signed with a key of its own event (Ed25519). A ticket cannot be made up or changed without the signature breaking.
  • Door scanners hold only the event's public keys, so a lost or opened-up scanner can make no ticket. The list a scanner works from is signed too.
  • A copied QR code is caught by the scan log: the first scan of a ticket lets it in, at whichever door, and every later one is refused.

Buyers' details

  • Buyers' email addresses and phone numbers are stored encrypted, with a one-way hash to find them by. A WhatsApp conversation with an organiser's bot does not keep an address or number typed into it in plain text either.
  • A buyer has no account: the links to their order and tickets carry a random token, of which Wildfire keeps only a hash.
  • A buyer's name, address and number are shown to the promoter only for an order that went to payment, never for a cart that was let go.
  • Logs about orders are scrubbed of buyers' details, ticket codes and links before they are written.
  • Visitors are asked about cookies per promoter, with two separate choices: measuring their visits, and advertising (Meta, TikTok, Snapchat, Reddit, Spotify, Google). Saying no is as easy as saying yes, a Cookies link at the foot of every event page and shop changes the answer, and a no deletes the advertising platforms' cookies.
  • Visits to an event's page or shop are kept only after the visitor's yes to measuring visits for that promoter, under a random code hashed per promoter, without an internet address or an ad's click code; a visitor who never signs up or buys is deleted after 30 days.
  • An ad's click code is kept on an order or a sign-up only after the visitor's yes to advertising for that promoter, and nothing a buyer or someone who signs up does on a page goes to an advertising platform without that yes. A sign-up through an ad's form is never told to one. A sign-up or an order made in a WhatsApp chat, where nobody is asked, is told to Meta, Snapchat or Spotify with the contact details hashed and nothing of a device, on the organiser's legitimate interest, and never for someone who objected to advertising.

Busy on-sales and bots

  • A busy on-sale gets a waiting room. Who arrives before the start gets a random place, so being early does not mean being first, and people who signed up for the event can go first.
  • Joining the waiting room and making a cart can be checked by Cloudflare Turnstile, and each network and each email address can only take so many places and tickets.
  • Requests are limited per address, and payments are paced per Stripe account, so one rush cannot hold up other promoters.

Who processes data for Wildfire

  • Contabo (Contabo GmbH, Germany): The server Wildfire runs on, which Wildfire manages itself and which holds the database and the files.
  • Dropbox (Dropbox, Inc., United States): The nightly backups, encrypted on Wildfire's server before they leave it, so Dropbox cannot read them. Each is kept for 7 days.
  • Cloudflare (Cloudflare, Inc., United States): Domain names, the network in front of Wildfire's server, and the check that a visitor is a person (Turnstile) at busy sales.
  • Stripe (Stripe Payments Europe, Limited, Ireland): Ticket payments, made on the organiser's own Stripe account, and Wildfire's own billing of organisers.
  • Resend (Plus Five Five, Inc., United States): Sending every email: the organisers' campaigns from their own domains, the mails about tickets, and Wildfire's own mail about accounts.
  • Meta (Meta Platforms Ireland Limited, Ireland): WhatsApp messages, for organisers who use WhatsApp (the WhatsApp Business Platform), sign-ups through an organiser's ads on Facebook and Instagram, the posts an organiser publishes on their own Facebook Pages and Instagram accounts and the comments and messages people send them there, and, only after a visitor's yes to advertising given to that organiser, the organiser's Meta pixel and the sign-ups and purchases on their pages told to it. And, for an organiser who connects their own ad account, their customer lists: the email addresses and phone numbers of the organiser's buyers and sign-ups, made unreadable (hashed), so the organiser's ads reach them or leave them out, except anyone who objected.
  • TikTok (TikTok Technology Limited, Ireland): The videos an organiser publishes on their own TikTok account. And only for an organiser who adds a TikTok pixel, and only after a visitor's yes to advertising given to that organiser: the pixel, and the purchases told to it. And, for an organiser who connects their own ad account, their customer lists: the email addresses and phone numbers of the organiser's buyers and sign-ups, made unreadable (hashed), so the organiser's ads reach them or leave them out, except anyone who objected.
  • Google (Google Ireland Limited, Ireland): Google Tag Manager, only for an organiser who adds one and only after a visitor's yes to advertising given to that organiser; Google Ads, for an organiser who connects their own account: their hashed customer lists (Customer Match), and, only after a visitor's yes to advertising, the sign-ups and purchases told to their conversion action; notifications to the Wildfire app on the Android phones of an organiser's team (Firebase Cloud Messaging); and the mailbox that receives the email people send to Wildfire.
  • Snap (Snap B.V., the Netherlands): Only for an organiser who connects their own Snapchat ad account or adds a Snapchat pixel: their customer lists (the email addresses and phone numbers of the organiser's buyers and sign-ups, made unreadable (hashed), so the organiser's ads reach them or leave them out, except anyone who objected), and, only after a visitor's yes to advertising given to that organiser, the sign-ups and purchases told to the pixel.
  • Reddit (Reddit, Inc., United States): Only for an organiser who connects their own Reddit Ads account: their customer lists (the email addresses of the organiser's buyers and sign-ups, made unreadable (hashed), so the organiser's ads reach them or leave them out, except anyone who objected). And for an organiser who adds its conversions, only after a visitor's yes to advertising given to that organiser: the sign-ups, shop steps and purchases told to it.
  • Spotify (Spotify AB, Sweden): Only for an organiser who connects their own Spotify ad account: their customer lists (the email addresses and phone numbers of the organiser's buyers and sign-ups, made unreadable (hashed), so the organiser's ads reach them or leave them out, except anyone who objected). And for an organiser who adds its conversions, only after a visitor's yes to advertising given to that organiser: the sign-ups, shop steps and purchases told to it.
  • Apple (Apple Inc., United States): Notifications to the Wildfire app on the iPhones of an organiser's team.
  • Weeztix (Weeztix, the Netherlands): For organisers who sell their tickets through Weeztix, their own choice: their orders read into Wildfire, and orders placed in their Weeztix shop through WhatsApp.
  • ntfy (ntfy.sh): Alerts to Wildfire's own staff when something needs a person to look at it.
  • Anthropic (Anthropic, PBC, United States): The assistant in the dashboard, which answers an organiser's questions about Wildfire and about selling tickets, and the AI writer that drafts an automation's email for them.
  • YouTube, Vimeo, Spotify and SoundCloud (Google Ireland Limited (YouTube), Vimeo.com, Inc. (United States), Spotify AB (Sweden), SoundCloud Global Limited & Co. KG (Germany)): A video or playlist an organiser puts on their event page. Nothing loads from them until the visitor presses play.
  • Where each keeps details, and on what basis any leave the European Economic Area, is in Wildfire's privacy statement on wildfire.tickets/privacy.

Reporting a vulnerability

  • Found something? Write to [email protected] with what you found and how to see it. We answer within three working days.
  • Please do not look at, change or keep other people's data, do not test against an on-sale that is running, and give us time to fix it before you tell anyone else. We will not take action against research done that way.